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This is a study of the ideological contestation by analyzing the reform discourses 
of the media scholars, media policymakers and media practitioners in China's media 
reform in 90s. This paper argues that there co-exist two paradigms of media operations in 
China's media system and the two are in a constant state of struggling with each other. 
The introduction of the new market-based media paradigm leads to the modification of 
the old Party-press paradigm. Usually the change takes three steps— transplantation, 
domestication and legitimation. And the change of the old paradigm involves the 
attention-shift of the community, and the redefining and repositioning the old concepts 
and practices. The Party-press paradigm, though challenged during the media reforms, 
tries to maintain its domination, while the market-based media paradigm emerge and 
grow within the framework of the old institutions. Yet the resulting changed paradigm is 
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Studying the Changing Reform Discourse in China's Media Reforms 
In the tradition of sociology of knowledge, social changes, particularly reforms, are 
sometimes studied in terms of the dialectic relationship between the reform ideas and their 
social contexts. Wuthnow (1989) observes, the power of ideas depends on the "articulation" 
between the ideology and the social environment; great ideas always draw resources, insights, 
and inspirations from their social environment and they must “articulate as well as dis-
articulate at the same time，，with the social settings. Articulation in this sense is a feature of 
social stability and integration, while dis-articulation both signifies and prompts social 
changes. 
To follow this tradition in studying China's media reform is to provide a social historical 
analysis of reform discourse. This study is an attempt toward this direction. It examines the 
articulation of the media reform ideas and the social environment in China's reform era in 
China by studying the changes in reform discourse. 
The term "reform discourse" is closely related to the conception of "community of 
discourse" (Wuthnow, 1989)，a collection of the social actors who participate in the 
construction of a particular discourse and are bound by their shared concerns and the value 
underpinnings of the discourse. In China's reform era, the reform discourse is a mixture of all 
the scholarly, professional, and official discourses on media operations in the changing 
environment. As will be illustrated in the later chapters, this body of discourses involves the 
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contestation of different ideas attached to different belief systems. The opponents and the 
proponents of various reform ideas and practices are linked by their shared concern in media 
reforms, constituting a "community of discourse". The media reforms are the continuous 
contestation of ideas involving these actors. With this concept of the "discourse of 
community," our analysis of the changing discourse in the reform era becomes sociologically 
grounded. This thesis is aimed at documenting the patterns of idea contestation in the reform 
era, aided by these two concepts, articulation and "community of discourse." 
However, the community of discourse is not only based on a shared interest in the media 
reforms, but also on shared symbolic resources. Following this general premise, Zelizer (1993) 
examines how American journalists interpret and reinterpret the historical exemplars such as 
media's roles in the development of McCarthyism and Watergate, showing that journalists are 
an "interpretive community" united by “its shared discourse and collective interpretations". 
Zelizer's work clearly shows how the journalist community is bound and integrated by 
continuous articulation and re-articulation of the basic professional values and principles with 
the changing realities of media operation. It is through the dynamic interpretive process of 
striving for a mutually shared understanding of the conditions for the reforms that in Mainland 
China, journalists, media scholars and media policy-makers together form the "community of 
discourse" referred to in this study. 
‘ Generally speaking, the scholars, professionals, and the officials are the main actors in the 
community. They involve in the production of the reform discourse, playing different roles in 
the discursive community. Yet their roles are closely interdependent with one another. 
1) Media officials and regulators (including people with political power) often provide the 
ideological and political legitimacy to reform ideas and thus have the final say in acceptance 
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or rejection of a reform idea or practice in China. 
2) Media scholars/ educators observe and analyze the reform practices and provide 
interpretations of the practices. They also corroborate the ideas "from the above". 
Sometimes they also challenge the official discourse by providing alternative interpretations 
of the media reforms. 
3) Media practitioners are people who do most of the experimental testing in media reforms 
and provide part of the reasoning of the reform ideas. They are the producers of the new 
practices and innovations that are the ground and basis of the new beliefs. What they do in 
media reforms become evidence of various reform ideas. Although the party leaders later 
refute some of their practices, their practices coupled by the changing environment of media 
operations keep pushing the theoretical and institutional boundaries of the current media 
systems. 
This paper argues that the new ideas brought into the community by the media scholars and 
the professionals have their social roots in the social context of the economic reforms in the 
1990s. And the introduction of them and the approval by the media policy-makers pave the 
way for the other reform practices and institutional changes, which in turn corroborate the new 
ideas. Through such a dynamic of ideological contestation or discursive struggle, the media 
reforms are going through a progress of reminiscent to a paradigm change. 
In this thesis, by bringing to light the changes in reform discourse in the social settings of the 
1990s，I hope to provide some insights in answering the following research questions: How do 
ideas contest each other in the media reforms? How does the Party's Party-press belief system 
incorporate the ideas from the market-based belief system? 
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The effort to answer these questions leads to a paper with five main parts. The first part 
introduces the research topic and area of concern. Chapter one states the theoretical framework 
and the methodology. The next chapter examines the two belief systems (paradigms) found in 
the reform discourse during the 90s. It also shows the roles played by the media policy makers, 
the media scholars and the media practitioners in the community of discourse in the production 
of the reform discourse. 
Chapter three is a case study of a pair of concepts to illustrate how the paradigm of media 
operation changes in the reform era. The relative decline of the old Party-press paradigm and 
the corresponding rise of the new Market-based media paradigm are a complex process full of 
struggles and confrontations. This chapter will analyze how the new paradigm gains its 
strength and popularity and how the old paradigm gradually fades out. The rise and fall of the 
two paradigms are demonstrated by the changes in the use of the two concepts in the reform 
discourse. The final chapter, chapter four, is a conclusion and discussion section. It draws some 
tentative conclusions based on the research findings and discuss the implications to the further 
studies on media reforms. 
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Chapter One 
Paradigm Change in media reforms 
1.1 paradigm of media operation: theoretical framework 
In the previous literature on China's media reforms, there are several major approaches. 
The political economy perspective is a major approach (e.g., Lee, 1990; Chan, 1993). This 
approach concentrates in the conjoint and interactive impact of the political and market forces. 
The focus of such studies is the power relationships in the social life. For example, Polumbaum 
(1990) argues that the Chinese journalists are always trying to find a balancing point between 
the party and the readers at the same time. 
Another way of looking at the media change is to focus on changes in institutions, such as 
changes in rules, policies and regulations. Chen (1999) conducts an industry-level study and 
concludes that the media industry in China is changing from a Party-press system towards a 
market-based system. Huang and Wei (1998) also study the institutional change of the media 
industry in Mainland China, using the framework of institutional economics, and point out that 
commercialization is the key feature of the change. Huang and Ding (1997) study the transition 
of the Party-press to of the "media industry" in China and argue that the profit orientation and 
pursuit of the relative independence are among the key features of the tide of industrialization. 
While the political economy perspective copes mainly with the external conditions of the 
media, the institutional change perspective focuses on the institutionalized media practices of 
in the reforms. They have touched the changes in the media ideology and the media operation. 
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Yet one general challenge is how to capture the articulation and interaction between the reform 
ideas, practices and changing social environment in China's media reforms study. 
Some attempts have been made to integrate the media reform ideas and the media reform 
practices. For example, Pan (1997) argues that the deconstruction of the commandist 
journalistic principles and practices is achieved by the journalists' creative use of the 
alternative symbolic resources found in their discourses. Pan (2000) also did an ethnographic 
study to explain how journalists' improvised practices should be linked to the institutional 
reconfigurations in the media reforms. 
This study focuses on how changes in media ideology are related to the media practices. 
Their dialectic relationship is discussed through the perspective of sociology of knowledge, 
aided by the organizing device of "paradigm". 
Paradigm is a concept borrowed from Thomas Kuhn (1962). By paradigm, Kuhn (1962) 
meant that the constellation of beliefs, values, and techniques shared by a given knowledge-
production community. It raises questions to be addressed, points out the direction of research， 
prescribes the principles and procedures of research operation, and provides research 
exemplars to be followed. The idea has been used to study journalistic work in the sociology of 
news. In this line of research, newsmaking is viewed as a paradigm-based process. A news (or 
journalistic) paradigm is seen to be permeate all aspects of media's organizational operations to 
"reduce environmental uncertainty by routinizing their recurring task activities, enforcing 
organizational norms and values, and exercising social control in the newsroom"(Chan & Lee， 
1991). 
In this study, I use the term of paradigm to refer to the shared ideas on media operation. 
These ideas are rooted in a particular belief system on media's role and functions in a society, 
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media's structural position in a political and economic system, and the normative values and 
principles governing media operation. This idea of "paradigm of media operation" is based on 
the premise that media operation is a paradigm-based process. 
In order to plan, execute, and evaluate their work, all the media practitioners must be 
trained in a system that embodies a set of beliefs and practices and must internalize such beliefs 
and principles governing such routine practices (Breed, 1955). That is, the operations are based 
on a shared paradigm. The paradigm-based media operations can bee understood in three 
aspects. 
First of all, all the media organizations operate within particular media systems. Behind 
the media operation there is a set of basic values and normative beliefs upon which the media 
institution is built and constructed. Schramm(1956) argues that there are basically four 
theories of media. McQuail (1994) also concludes that there exist some major normative media 
theories, among them are the Soviet media theory and the free media theory. Scholars define 
China's media systems as a "commandist" media system (e.g., Lee, 1990; Wu, 1994). 
Yuan Qingming (1996) observes that China's media institution is built upon some 
established views, which prescribe the Party's overall domination over the media. The core of 
these views is the definition of the media as the ruling Party's mouthpiece and instrument. The 
former Party leaders and the current Party leaders repeatedly emphasize these news views in 
the official discourse ( Jiang, 1993; Hu, 1985). 
Secondly, the institutional arrangement of the media is also based on the established 
beliefs and values. For example, the monopoly of the central Party organs in the media 
structure is part of the institutional arrangement in China. The Party organs own the advantage 
in the news sources, in the financial subsidy and in social status. There are also various rules 
and regulations which say the media practitioners should obey the "propaganda principle" 
(Guo, 1997). If these rules and regulations are violated, the violator will be punished to 
11 
maintain the integrity of the institution. 
Lastly, the principles for routine practices are standardized under the guidance of the 
Party-press belief systems. For instance, the front page of the major papers should carry the 
stories of the Party leaders' daily activities. These kinds of practices are already routinized by 
repetition and taken for granted by the media practitioners. 
In sum, in the Chinese media's operations and the values systems behind them, there exist 
recognizable consistency and stability, which can be expressed by the term of "paradigm of 
media operation". 
The same kind of paradigm can be found in other countries and other societies, such as the 
liberal democratic societies. For example, in the United States there is a set of market-based 
media operations, which are matched by their liberal news values and the relevant theories. The 
overall values, the institutional arrangements, and the routines correspond and support each 
other, forming a paradigm with its own validity (See Gitlin, 1980; Gans，1980; Turow, 1997). 
Many scholars have borrowed or been inspired by this concept in their study of media, 
based on the belief that journalism possesses many characteristics of paradigm-based fields. 
For example, Chan and Lee (1991) use this concept "journalistic paradigm" to refer to "a set of 
taken-for-granted and unspoken assumptions, cognitive maps, or gestalt world views that 
inform the media as to what social facts to report and how to interpret them". Reese (1992) 
employs this concept to study the maintenance of the ideological hegemony. Bennett et.al. 
(1985) use concept of paradigm in study of news production, pointing out that when a news 
story is at odds with the existing paradigm, the usual practice is to re-interpret it. In sum, to 
most scholars, the use of "paradigm" is basically limited to paradigm of news production 
activities. In my study, "paradigm" is used to organize all the media operations ranging from 
the news production practices to the media management activities. 
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Aided by the concept of "paradigm", I hope to 
• Identify the logical connection and contrasts of different reform ideas and 
practices 
• facilitate the analysis of the development of such ideas and practices as 
manifestation of changing belief systems 
• deconstruct and collate the individual discourses in media reforms 
To understand paradigm change in the discourse on media reforms, I will make use of 
"anomaly" and "crisis", two important concepts borrowed from Kuhn along with the concept 
of "paradigm." 
Anomalies are unexpected and unexplained facts which challenge the fundamental 
assumptions of the current paradigm. The paradigm then has to be adjusted so that the novelties 
of fact can be incorporated and become the expected. If the adjustment is unsuccessful, then a 
crisis of the paradigm will emerge. 
One example of the anomalies in China's media operation is the so-called paid 
journalism. Wu (1995) observed that in early 90s most Chinese journalists and editors have 
involved in various kinds of business activities, from buying and selling stocks to soliciting the 
advertising fees. They receive payment in writing news stories on business activities. The paid 
journalism violated the party journalism principles long held by the journalistic community. As 
one Chinese scholar points out, it is a result of the co-existence of two operating systems (Hu, 
1995). Pan (1997) characterizes it as a form of market subsidies to media operation. 
Crisis is the "common awareness that something has gone wrong" (Kuhn, 1962). It is the 
awareness of a genuine problem. Crisis happens in different levels and can take many forms. In 
China's media reforms, financial problem and budget deficit resulted from the reduction of 
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state subsidies are a kind of crisis for the media, while loss of credibility due to the decline in 
the ideological legitimacy of the Party is another form of crisis. Yet they are all signs of the 
current media institution's inability to cope with the changing social environment. 
Debates are often a trademark of a crisis. When there is a crisis, members of the 
community often raise fundamental questions they once assumed that they have arrived at the 
right and complete answers. The debates over the fundamental issues suggest that the validity 
of the old theories is at stake. 
I will argue that the introduction of the market operations into the Chinese media in the 
1990s leads to a change in the paradigms of media operation. The financial crisis of the media 
organizations is the direct social imperative to the change and the direction of the change is the 
infusion of the market-based paradigm into the party-press paradigm. 
1.2 Methodology 
Documentary analysis is the main tool of analysis in the study. My work to do in this 
study is to sift through the existing materials and analyze the reform discourse on China's 
media reforms in the 1990s. In looking through the materials I pay special attention to the key 
concepts and catchy-phrases in the reform discourse. These frequently encountered concepts in 
the public discourse are the key to the study of the paradigm change in media reform. The 
materials I looked through consist of two kinds—the primary materials and the secondary 
materials. 
Table 1 Types of documents and their status as sources of empirical data 
Primary materials; 
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—Trade publications in journalism and media 
The trade publications are the core journals in journalism, such as Journalism Front 
edited by the People's Daily, Journalistic University edited by the School of journalism, 
Fudan University. These publications are the venues where the members of the 
discursive community discuss and exchange their reform ideas and present their 
discourse of reform practices. They are also the venues where different ideas contest each 
other. 
—Published books on the "models of successful media reforms" 
One kind of the books consists of the record and analysis of a successful media 
organizations, such as The News Impact published by the People's University Press 
(Zheng, et. al，1994). This is a book on the dramatic rise of Beijing Youth News, a non 
Party-organ newspaper in the media market. The book is written by a group of media 
scholars in Beijing. Another kind consists of books written by the media practitioners 
themselves, often the chief-editors, such as Being the Chief-editor of Evening News 
published by Fudan University Press (Ding, 1999). These books are summaries of the 
media organizations' reform ideas and practices. 
China Journalism Yearbooks 
This is the country's most authoritative record on journalism publish by the China 
Social Science Academy. It provides an overview of the major media events and 
discourses of the year. 
Secondary materials; 
一 Studies done by the overseas scholars on China's media reforms 
These materials are centered around the research topic of China's media reforms, with 
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different theoretical perspectives (e.g., Chan, 1993,1994; Chen 1999; He, 1998: 
Huang&Wei, 1998; Lee, 1990,1994; Pan, 1997, 2000; Polumbaum, 1990; Wu&Liao, 
2000; Zhao, 1998). 
In using the primary materials I hope to identify the significant reform ideas and 
discursive accounts of reform practices during the 1990s. Some key individuals are selected 
and special attention is put to their discourses. They are 1) high-rank officials with political 
power, such as Jiang Zemin; 2) head of the highly-successful media organizations, such as 
Ding Fazhang，the chief-editor of the country's largest Evening newspaper; and 3) influential 
media scholar, such as Li Liangrong, who published several books on journalism theories. The 
frequently encountered concepts in their reform discourse are the components of the changing 
paradigms. 
The authors of the secondary materials are not actors in the Chinese discursive 
community, nor have they directly taken part in China's media reforms. These materials help to 
interpret the reform discourse with scientific terms. It also helps me to draw connection with 
my interpretation and the others' studies. 
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Chapter Two 
One Decade Two paradigms 
2.1 One decade, Two paradigms 
In this chapter I will analyze the two paradigms found in the reform discourse on the 
media reforms in 9 0 s o n e is the party-press paradigm; the other is the market-based media 
paradigm. They are the basic frameworks structuring the Chinese media reform discourse. 
In this paper I will argue that there exist two paradigms in the same decade in China's 
media operations. Sometimes the two paradigms can even coexist in the same speech. For 
instance, Ding Fazhang, when he was a chief-editor of a popular newspaper, in speaking of his 
paper's successful reform, gave the political achievement the top priority. To "successfully 
carry out the Party's propaganda tasks and avoid the political errors" are the newspaper's chief 
commitments. After that, Ding also use statistics to show how the newspaper's advertising 
revenues and total asset grow dramatically in the past few years (Ding, 1999). 
There are two kinds of logic in his speech. One the one hand, the vocabulary of the 
Party-press journalism can be found almost in every paragraph, such as the "all our 
achievements are gained under the wise leadership of the Party and the government", etc. On 
the other hand, the market-based media logic is also presented through the economic terms like 
"advertising revenue", "investment", and "property," which are frequently used in his speech. 
It is noteworthy that he not only employed the economic terms, but also the logical reasoning of 
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the economics. For example, Ding agreed to develop the newspaper's diversified economy 
(duozhong jingying), because "we are so rich, if we do not invest our money and make a profit, 
isn't it a waste of golden opportunity?，，（Ding, 1999，p227). 
Beijing Youth News, another popular newspaper in 90s, also shows the same pattern in 
their reform discourse (Zheng et. al, 1994). In their discourse, the editors of this popular 
newspaper "do not forget to educate the youth by various propaganda campaigns" although the 
paper also claims that the essence of their success was to serve the readers with diversified 
information. 
The contradiction and coexistence of the two paradigms in the same media system can 
be observed at every level of media system. For example, He (1998) found that one media 
phenomenon of China is very unique~the inconsistency of the media content in the front-page 
news and new on other pages. The Party organ is said to have "a socialistic face and a 
capitalistic body，，in the middle of 90s. ^ While the front page is full of the prototypical news of 
the activities of the Party leaders, the content of the other pages is guided by the market logic 
and is more service-oriented. This is the manifestation of the coexistence of the two different 
paradigms within the same newspaper in terms of media content. Other scholar also found that 
the defining feature of Chinese media system lies in the mixed influences of two critical 
forces- the Party force and the market force on the media (Polumbaum, 1990; Chan, 1993，Li, 
1995). How to interpret the interactions of the two forces and their impact on the media 
operations is still a challenge. Huang (1994) argues that China's media system is going through 
a "peaceful evolution" from the commandist system toward a market system. Zhao (1998) 
observes that it is a mixture and infusion of the market logic and the Party logic. Some argue 
^He(1998),p82-83. 
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that the basic media system remains basically unchallenged in the past decades (Yuan, 1996; Li, 
1995). And the changes in the media operations, despite their contradictions with the Party-
press media system, happen within the framework of the existing media system (Pan, 1997). 
The relationship between the two forces is the key to understand the media reforms in 
China. In this thesis, I will argue that the incorporation of the market logic into the Party-press 
media system is the essence of China's media reforms. The two sets of ideas are labeled "the 
Party-press paradigm" and the "market-based media paradigm" in this paper to facilitate 
the analysis. I need to stress that there is no evidence of a pure market-based media paradigm 
and its exemplar in current China, yet the dichotomy provides a basis to understand the changes 
in the reform discourse. The basic beliefs of Party-press paradigm give the community 
members a base line from which the novelty in ideas and in practices may be compared. In this 
sense, I will also use "the old paradigm" and "the new paradigm" to refer to the above-
mentioned two media operation paradigms. 
There are three components in a paradigm: shared worldview, shared procedures in 
problemitizing and generating data, and models or exemplars that exemplify and typify the 
above-mentioned two (Kuhn, 1962). The following table is a brief summary of the key 
components of the two paradigms of media operations found in the reform discourse in the 
1990s. 
The core of the worldview for the members of the journalistic community is the nature of 
the media. So in this table, the nature of the media is seen as the key idea of the worldview. For 
the standard procedures in the media operation, two basic principles are highlighted~the 
propaganda principle and the profit-making principle. They are the brief summaries of the rules 
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of media operations in the two paradigms. The propaganda principle prescribes that the topics 
of the journalism should be defined by the Party, and the readers and audience are to be 
educated and guided by the media, which provides “role models，，to follow. News is tailored to 
Party's propaganda needs, if necessary, and the news stories are highly positive, didactic, and 
value-laden. The profit-making principle prescribes that the readers or audiences are the 
masters of the media. And news stories should meet their interests and needs. As the 
advertising revenue is the most important source of revenue for the media, the media's market 
success is measured mainly by their circulation numbers and shares in the advertising market. 
As to the exemplars, Beijing Youth News and Xinmin Evening News are two of the 
frequently mentioned "reform models" in China's media reforms in the 90s. The exemplar of 
the old paradigm is the long-term model of the Party-press tradition, People's Daily (Wu, 
1994). 
Table 2 Brief comparison and contrast of the two paradigms of media operations 
PARTY-PRESS MEDIA MARKET-BASED MEDIA 
PARADIGM PARADIGM 
World view Media as the mouthpiece of the Media as the profit-making entity 
Party and government in the market 
Norms & rules of Propaganda principle Profit-making principle 
media operations 
Models and People's Daily Beijing Youth News exemplars Xinmin Evening News^ 
2.2 The historical context for the co-existence of two paradigms in 90s 
It is also the aim of this chapter to examine social context that facilitates the new 
2 Beijing Youth News and Xinmin Evening News are two newspapers which have achieved huge market 
success. 
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paradigm to grow within the framework of the old paradigm. The phenomena of "one decade, 
two paradigms" in China need to be connected to the large-scale social arrangements in 
China's reform-era. 
Scholars have noted that the changes in Chinese media in 90s are characterized by 
"commercialization within the framework of the old Party-press media system and without 
press freedom" (Lee, 1990; Chan, 1993). The changes in the media institutions are mainly 
limited in the financial aspects (Chen, 1999). The emergence of the market-based media 
paradigm involves a basic change in Chinese society—the rise of the market force, which 
comes with the economic reforms, and the gradual yet limited loosening of political control. 
The remarkable transforming variables are: the gradual termination of the state subsidy to the 
media organizations, the introduction of advertising industry to the media, and the 
establishment of the State Press and Publication Administration (Pan, 2000). 
China's media reforms in the past two decades show how the Party journalism interact 
with the changing political and economic context of China. In the 1980s the credibility crisis of 
the media after the Cultural Revolution led to the reforms aimed to "show respect to the 
journalistic rules (zunzhong xinwen guilu)，，(Li，1995). But in 1990s, the crisis for the media 
organizations shifted mainly to budget crisis. The budget crisis was the result of the 
government's gradual cutting off the public fund subsidy and the flexible price systems 
introduced into the former planned economy of Mainland China (Song, 1994). The media 
reform went to changing the media organizations to the "public units with business 
management (shiye danwei, qiye guanli)，，(Li, 1995). 
The Party organs and the non-Party organs are "pushed to the market，，(Liang，1992). 
They are forced to find ways to sustain themselves financially and survive the apparent crisis. 
The economic reforms and the resurrection of the advertising industry in China brought some 
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fundamental changes in the media's revenue structure. In the mid-90s, the advertising revenue 
has become the most important source for the media organizations (Chen, 1999). However, the 
intense involvement of the media into the business industry also resulted in some "anomalies", 
such as the paid journalism ( Wu, 1995). With these new phenomena in the 90s came the 
theoretical crisis一are the media organizations still the party organs? How to explain the 
profit-making activities within the framework of the Party-press paradigm? The theoretical 
crisis is an indication that there is a need to change or modify the old Party-press paradigm. 
2.3 The formation of reform discourse in the journalistic community 
Having analyzed the social background of the media reforms of the past two decades, this 
part will go to the empirical data I have collected in the review of the reform discourse in 90s. I 
will show in this section how the Party-press paradigm incorporates the ideas from the 
market-based media paradigm into its framework in the "reform discourse". 
The following table is a brief summary of the significant ideas and the key figures in the 
community of discourse. The choice of these individuals is based on political authority, 
representatives of ideas, and degrees of influence or prominence in the discursive community. 
They are grouped based on their respective institutional roles: officials and media regulators, 
media practitioners, and media scholars. The table locates them by their relationships with the 
two paradigms based upon the key ideas they each is associated with through their writings 
and/ or actions. The repeated use of some ideas and concepts results in the formulated 
statements, which are listed in the table. 
Table 3 
Key figures in the "community of discourse" and their ideas and their relationships with 
the two co-exist paradigms 
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Relation with Relation 
Name the old with the new Key ideas and Contributions 
paradigm paradigm 
Major officials and media policymakers 
Deng Xiaoping + + Socialist market economy 
Jiang zemin + - Party principle, politics first 
Xu Guangchun + + Art of propaganda 
Ding Guangen + -- Party principle 
Xu Weicheng + - Positive propaganda principle 
Gong Xueping + + Media's structural adjustment 
Liang Heng + + Four natures of journalism 
Media professionals 
Yang + ++ Reform in the style of programs 
Weiguang 
Li Yuanjiang + ++ Press conglomeration 
Multiple management 
Cui Enqing - ++ Commercial newspapers 
Ding Ximan + + Studying the Evening paper 
Ding Fazhang + + Natures of Evening papers 
Guo Chaoren + ^ Mouthpiece Theory 
Media scholars 
Sun Xupei - + Press freedom 
Li Liangrong - + Stages in the process of media 
reforms 
Yu Guoming - + Media management 
Huang - + Industrialization 
Shengmin 
Chen Lidan _ unclear Reflection on old paradigm 
Liu Jiamning - + Press freedom 
+ proponent; ++ strong proponent. 
-opponent, 一 strong opponent. 
We can see that the formation of reform discourse is bringing together the incoherent 
theories from different paradigms and the disconnected discourse on the reform practices. 
Social actors differ in their roles in the community of discourse and their attitudes towards the 
two paradigms. In the discussion of the ideological contestation, the considerations of the two 
paradigms give us a base line from which the position of a social actor may be discussed. With 
the help of the two paradigms, a particular piece of reform discourse at hand is located and 
defined. 
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Roles of different actors 
Policymaker: tone-setter and controller 
Table 3 listed leaders of the Party (such as Jiang Zemin and Deng Xiaoping), ideological 
chiefs of the Party (e.g. Ding Guangen, Xu Weicheng^), and the head of the administrative 
management (e.g., Liang Heng4). Their speeches occupy the most important pages in the trade 
journals of the field, such as the China Journalism Yearbook, Journalistic Front, etc. Their 
writings and speeches are followed by the articles of discussion (xuexi tihui) written by media 
scholars and media practitioners. The media officials and regulators are in the position to 
winnow reform ideas from practices and to provide political and ideological legitimacy to them. 
They do not necessarily defend the old paradigm without regard of new ideas. Rather, they try 
to incorporate new ideas into the old paradigm. By doing so, they play a crucial role in 
changing the old paradigm and softening the challenge of the new one. 
Among the policymakers and Party leaders, Deng xiaoping is the most important one. It is 
Deng who introduced the concept of "market economy" into the socialistic ideological system 
(Liang, 1996). His speech in 1992, in which he forcefully advocated speeding reforms toward 
marketization, ridded the political uncertainties associated with many reform ideas and 
practices. Deng's words became the ultimate source of ideological legitimacy for those who are 
at the forefront of the reforms. 
3 Ding and Xu are both the heads of the Party's propaganda department, wwhich exercise direct control 
over media. 
4 Liang is the head of the State Press and Publication Administration (SPPA). 
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Jiang Zemin, Ding Guangen, and Xu Weicheng share the same kind of vocabulary and 
logic in their discourse (Jiang, 1993，1996; Ding, 1996; Xu, 1993). The key point in their 
speech is to emphasize the importance of Party principle, which is expressed by phrases like 
"improve the sense of politics", "serve the Party and people，，，and “give the politics the top 
priority." They are the proponents of the Party-press paradigm. Xu Guangchun also belongs to 
this camp, yet his view is slightly different from the above-mentioned policy-makers. He also 
treats propaganda as the central task of the media, yet, he elaborates what he calls “art of 
propaganda" (Xu, 1998). He agrees that media organizations should care for the economic 
profit, yet when the economic profit and the social benefit are at odds with each other, the 
social benefit should be the more important one of the two (Xu, 1996). 
On the whole, the policy-makers and Party leaders are skeptical to the new paradigm and 
loyal to the old paradigm, and the loyalty can be found in their repeated use of the terms and 
logic of the old paradigm. Even if they try to interpret the media phenomena of the western 
societies, they use the framework of Marxist theories. Xu Weicheng once employed the 
framework of Marxist theories in discussing Japanese media (Xu, 1993). In so doing, the old 
paradigm is reproduced and maintained. 
In emphasizing the media's mouthpiece role in propaganda, it is no surprise that the 
media policy-makers' discourse is full of criticism of certain non-routine media practices and 
direct command on media operations. The policy-makers manage to maintain the domination 
of the old paradigm not only by repeating the values of Party journalism, but also by officially 
defining what is politically correct and incorrect (Xu, 1996). By drawing the boundaries, the 
old paradigm defends itself from existing and possible challenges. They also influence the 
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media operations through direct control and command. One example is the media policy-maker 
of Shanghai, Gong Xueping, directly plans and forces the merge of the Weihui Daily and 
Xinmin Evening News, despite the reluctance ofXinmin Evening News (Ding, 1999). 
It is noteworthy that Liang Heng, the head of the SPPA plays a unique and growing 
equivocal role in the community of discourse. In his speech and writing, we can find that he can 
differentiate the roles played by the government and the Party in media system (Liang, 1992). 
He is the proponent of both the old and the new paradigms. He does this by trying to find 
intervening terms which will harmonize the two paradigms. Like other media managers, he 
also quotes from Jiang Zemin, the Party leader's speech, yet he cites Jiang's comment on 
economic reforms to support his idea to build a media market in China. He contributes to the 
discursive community by officially acknowledging that media have a commodity feature, 
among other features (Liang, 1992). 
Media professional: change-initiator 
In Table 3，the individuals mentioned are either the head of an important media 
organization (e.g., Guo Chaoren, the head of Xinhua Agency), or the chief-editor of a "model 
of media reforms." Yang Weiguang ofCCTV, Li Yuanjiang of the Guangzhou Daily, and Ding 
Fazhang ofXinmin Evening News are all of this kind. Yang is the director of the country's only 
national television network. Li established the country's first newspaper conglomeration. And 
Ding had been the chief-editor of the country's largest local evening papers, the Xinmin 
Evening News. The individuals mentioned in this study share one thing more: they have all 
published articles or even books on journalism (e.g., Guo, 1997; Ding, 1999). 
The media practitioners often initiate new reform practices, which are more or less 
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adventurous at first but compelled by the pressure on an organization to survive in the market. 
The reform practices are often improvised, and often lack the prescription from the existing 
Party-press ideology and tradition (Pan, 1997). They are thus open to doubtful interpretations. 
The new practices bring new possibilities in theories, triggering further inquiries and 
examinations into reforms. 
A case in point is Beijing Youth News, a non-Party organ local newspaper that became 
extremely successful in the early 90s. Their success was called "Beijing Youth News 
Phenomenon" and attracted the attentions from other media organizations and media scholars, 
who claimed that this newspaper contributed to media reforms by its novel and non-routine 
practices (Zheng et. al，1994). Cui Enqing, the director of the paper, summarized their success 
in this way: “For a long time the journalistic community paid no attention to the commodity 
nature of newspaper, but our paper recognized this nature rather early” (Zheng et. al, 1994, 
p88). Beijing Youth Daily, and many other popular newspapers share this recognition and the 
need to play the market game (e.g，，Liang & Li，1995; Ding, 1999 )• 
New practices or facts bring with it theoretical uncertainties. Such uncertainties 
sometimes lead to dispute and controversy. Some of Guangzhou Daily's management practices, 
such as setting up its own chain supermarkets, invited dispute in the community of discourse 
(Ding, 1998). 
Generally speaking, the media professionals, those of the models of media reforms in 
particular, are proponents of market-based media paradigm. Of course, there are variations, 
such as Guo Chaoren, the head of the Xinhua Agency, who identifies to the old paradigm. Guo 
insists that the "good traditions" of the Party journalism and the status of the Party organs and 
state agency should be kept by all means (Guo, 1997). 
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Media scholar: corroborator and challenger 
The scholars' role in the discursive community is suspended judgment of the media 
reforms. It is observed that their theoretical studies and discourse often lag behind the reform 
practices (Shen, 1997). 
Scholars and educators often play double roles in the community of discourse. One the 
one hand, they need to elaborate the idea of the Party leaders and corroborate the existing ideas 
of the party-press paradigm. On the other hand, scholars can also help the media practitioners 
to evade the obstacles of the old paradigm, to find a conceptual space within the old paradigm 
to justify the market-based media operations. In this sense, they help to challenge and develop 
the old paradigm. 
Media scholars often need to find symbolic resources within the framework of the 
Party-press paradigm to discuss the media reforms. A typical example is a study done by Chen 
Lidan on the media reforms. He observed that, 
"The media reforms of nowadays are actually following the thinking of Liu Shaoqi (a 
former Party leader) many years ago.，，(Chen, 1998，p40) 
Chen finds that Liu has stated all the key ideas of the media reforms nowadays—the 
objectivity principle, the readability of the papers, the concern for the audience, and media 
competition and advertising etc. Chen argues that Liu's ideas are the elaboration, 
implementation, perfection and rectification of Mao Zedong's news thoughts. Liu's ideas are 
also significant contribution to Party organs' theories (Chen, 1998). 
In Chen's analysis, there is no direct confrontation of the two paradigms. Chen even uses 
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some logic of Party journalism in his reasoning. For instance, Liu's Party leader identity is 
thought to be related to the validity of his ideas. By giving credit to Liu's open-minded ideas, 
Chen implies his doubt on the old paradigm. 
This kind of vague and subtle expression is necessary because in China's journalistic 
community, academics are still under tight ideological-control. Some scholars, such as Sun 
Xupei and Li Liangrong, tried to put "press freedom，，on the reform agenda in the 1980s, yet 
without success (Sun, 1994; Li, 1995，Liu, 1991). For the idea of "press freedom" is a direct 
challenge and threat to the Party-press paradigm. 
The majority of the scholars in 90s, such as Huang Shengmin (1997), are more interested 
in the economic reform and industrialization of the media. Similarly, Yu Guoming is an 
advocate of "media management，，in the media reforms (Yu, 1993). 
The scholars are a mixed group. Some of them are accomplices of the authority in that 
they provide theoretical justifications and articulation of the efforts to incorporate or 
domesticate new ideas. They also provide the intellectual basis for winnowing out certain 
reform ideas or the particular threatening elements of a reform idea. Some of them are thriving 
in the market by serving the professionals or media industry. They play the role of articulating 
novel or non-routine practices in the terms acceptable by the established authority. In sum, their 
mixed roles prescribe their mixed attitudes towards the two paradigms. 
Through the interactions of the official discourse, the scholarly discourse and the 
professional discourse, some new concepts get weight and authority, some ideas and remarks 
are standardized and even become catchy-phrases. Some others are neglected or rejected. The 
formation of concluding beliefs is thus the mixture of the three kinds of discourse, which are 
summarized in Table 4: 
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Table 4 Official, scholarly, and professional discourses and their typical attitudes 
towards the two paradigms 
Types of discourses Relation with the old Relation with the new 
paradigm paradigm 
Official discourse + -
Scholarly discourse -/+ + 
Professional discourse - + 
+ proponent; - opponent. 
There are variations to these "typical professional" attitudes. We can observe that the reform 
models (such as the head of the popular Beijing Youth News) advocate both the two paradigms. 
They make full use of the two paradigms and manage to find a space between the overlapping areas 
of the two, where they can try and benefit from their reform ideas and practices. 
I have shown in the above paragraphs that those who have the final say in the acceptance 
and rejection of a reform idea or practice are those with the political power the party leaders, 
the media ideological officials and the media managers. This is the chief feature of the 
ideological contestation in China's media reforms. Keeping this in mind will help us 
understand how the new ideas struggle to achieve legitimacy and how the old ideas can 
maintain their domination in the process of media reforms. 
In the following paragraphs, I will try to examine how the paradigms contest each other in 
the level of worldview, norms and rules of media operations and the exemplars. 
At the fundamental level of worldview, there are two major thoughts about the media 
operation~the media's mouthpiece nature and the media's multiple natures. 
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The change from being mouthpiece to playing multiple roles accelerated in 1992 with the 
application of Deng's speech. However, this breakthrough at the theoretical level was achieved 
by "adding" a dimension to the existing framework, not replacing it. 
After 1992, the academic discussion of the double nature of the media brought the 
breakthrough in media reforms (Li, 1995). The economic reforms approved and advocated by 
the Party legitimized the commodity nature of the journalism and within a few years the double 
nature became a consensus (Li, 1995). During 1993-1994，the discussion on the commodity 
nature of the news/ newspaper reached its peak, yet, starting from 1995，academic articles on 
this topic became fewer and fewer，. 
Liang Heng (1996) reflected that the discussion of the basic natures of the media was 
very meaningful. To emphasize the significance of the discussion he said that like Deng 
Xiaoping's contribution to the traditional theory on socialism, the debate on the "commodity 
nature" resulted in the fundamental change in the worldview of journalism. 
This breakthrough in theory has two profound implications. First, many practices such as 
selling newspaper pages to advertisers, formerly assumed problematic, gained legitimacy. 
Second, and more importantly, this breakthrough in theory opens road for the future theoretical 
and practical breakthrough. Y. Xu, editor of the "Analysis and Discussion of Western Press 
Theories", reflected that "we felt so lucky that during the writing of this book, Deng 
Xiaoping's 1992 speech went public. It gave our work a vision. His speech served as a compass 
in our analysis and discussion of the Western theories.，，6 In 1995 and 1996 there came the wave 
of the "commercialization", both in theory and in practice. Some other new theories and 
practices emerged in the community with much ease, following the logical starting point of the 
commodity nature of the media. 
5 China Journalism Yearbook, 1996, pp58. 
6Xu Yaokui(1998)，p412-413. 
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Still, when there is contradiction between the mouthpiece nature and the community 
nature, which is common in media operations, media policy-makers argue there is a must to put 
the mouthpiece nature at the first place (Ding, 1996; Xu, 1996). 
. 广 
At the level of the norms and rules of the media operations, there are constant struggles 
and cooptation between the two different principles一the propaganda principle and the profit-
making principle. 
1992 saw a wave of commercialization in China's media. With the introduction of 
advertising industry, and the policy of business management (qiye guanli) of the media, the 
incentive for the media organizations to make a profit grows intensely. Media management 
became gradually institutionalized in Chinese media (Yu, 1993; Huang&Ding, 1997). 
At the more concrete level, the contestation of the two paradigms is apparent. In speaking 
of the popular readers' newspapers, Xu Guangchun observes that there is a contradiction 
between the social benefit and the economic profit. It seems that if such newspapers need to 
compromise the control of public opinion (yulun daoxiang) to be popular in the market (Xu, 
1996). In this sense, the two kinds of principle are incompatible. 
Yet, in reality, the two sets of rules co-exist in the same media system. As long as the 
profit-making media operations are unthreatening to the Party principle, it seems that they can 
be coopted peacefully, at least tentatively. That is why media scholars have labeled the change 
in China's media operation "commercialization without press freedom." (e.g, Chan, 1993) 
At the level of the exemplars, there are basically several kinds of models of media 
reforms, whose practices were copied by other media organizations and studied by scholars. 
One kind consists of Evening newspapers, like the Xinmin Evening News, which 
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cultivates a niche different from that of the party organs. They appeal to the private-fund 
subscription market. So in their discourse, they emphasize their difference from the Party 
organs, and claim they have unique "positioning" and “flmctions，，(Ding，1999). 
Another kind consists of CCTV and Guangzhou Daily, the major Party organs. Aided by 
their status in the media hierarchy and all the useful commercial means, they achieve both the 
political influence and financial profits. 
A third kind consists of papers such as the non-Party organ Beijing Youth News, which 
rises dramatically through competition in the market. It was called a "black horse” of the 
journalistic community in the early 90s because of its unexpected rise (Zheng et. al，1994). 
How do the exemplars change over the years? There may be a trend that the exemplars of 
media reforms will become confined to party organs. In the early 1990s, it was prosperity of the 
weekend-editions, the non-party organ newspapers that broke the traditional media structure 
dominated by the Party organs (Liang, 1996). As one media manager stated in 1997, "the stage 
of rapid development has ended in 1996，and in the future there will be a stage of quality, rather 
than quantity." Starting from this year, SPPA controlled the total amount of newspapers. And 
the major reform practice一"press conglomeration" became the privilege of the major Party 
organs (Yang, 1997). 
With the reform policy in favor of the major Party organs, it is theoretically difficult for 
the "Beijing Youth News phenomenon" to appear after 1996. The significance of Beijing 
Youth News lies in that it stands for a stage of rapid media reforms when there is relative free 
market competition. And in this sense, it is hard to see its like in the near future in China. 
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Chapter Three 
The Contestation of the two paradigms 
This chapter is mainly a case study of a pair of concepts to show how the reform discourse 
changes during the 1990s. The target concepts are "competition" and "monopoly." I will 
examine how the concepts are developed and how their meanings evolve during the 1990s. 
The process of paradigm change is full of inevitable struggles, in which the old 
paradigm tries to remain dominant and the new paradigm tries to gain attention and acceptance. 
Chan and Lee (1991) observed the change of journalistic paradigm in Hong Kong and argued 
that during the process the power centers have to coopt the press while the press in turn has to 
accommodate the pressure from the power centers. It is the aim of this chapter to illustrate the 
changing relative weights of two paradigms and their dialectical relationship. 
One pair of concepts that are analyzed in details in this chapter are~the "monopoly" 
versus "competition." They are the key constitutious elements of the two competing media 
paradigms in the media structure dimension. 
In the old Party-press paradigm, the monopoly of the major party organs in the 
hierarchy is assumed as the norm and rule of Chinese journalism. Each media organization has 
its administrative rank, which prescribes its political status and social status. So in China the 
local media should carry and copy the important editorials and the programs of the major media 
of the central level (Guo, 1997). For instance, CCTV has the country's only national television 
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network, which guarantees its unshakable status and its lion's share in the advertising market 
(Pan & Chan，1999). Apart from this, those media organizations high on the hierarchy, like 
major Party organs, have many other privileges, such as the subscription by the public fund 
policy. 
In the reform discourse of 1994, the "competition" between media organizations is not 
only acceptable according to the market rules, but also regarded as a "healthy and desirable" 
mechanism that will bring prosperity and benefit to the whole i n d u s t r y ? . Media organizations' 
status is judged by their market success, particularly by their advertising revenues. Some 
mass-appeal publications, such as the local evening papers, have achieved great market success 
and gained huge revenue in the 90s, thanks to the competition mechanism. 
"Monopoly" and "competition" are two concepts correspond to two paradigms and 
belief systems. The following table lists the relationships of the concepts mentioned above: 
Table 5 Two paradigms vs. Two concepts 
THE OLD PARADIGM THE NEW PARADIGM 
Core concepts Mouthpiece nature of media Profit-making entity nature of 
media 
Media Monopoly of major party organs Diversity and competition of 
structure in the hierarchy media organizations 
Exemplars The major party organs The mass-appeal papers 
(CCTV) (local Evening papers) 
Scholars find that great changes have taken place in the 1990s in the media structure. 
For instance, Pan and Chan (1999) observed the "slackening of the Chinese television 
structure" in the 90s. Zhao (1998) pointed out that the structural changes in the newspaper 
sector are even more diversified. I will try to demonstrate the process by which the concept of 
"monopoly" declines and the "competition mechanism" is accepted as a catchy-phrase and 
7 China Journalism Yearbook, 1994，ppll. 
35 
then institutionalized as a mechanism. 
3.1 The growth of a new paradigm: transplantation, domestication and legitimation 
Kuhn (1962) observed that those who introduced the new paradigms are almost always 
"very new to the field". Yet Wuthnow (1989) concluded that the new ideas always draw 
resources, insights, and inspiration from their social environment. The introduction of the new 
market-based media paradigm is a process of drawing resources from China's social 
environment of the 1990s. 
The conceptions of the economic reforms provide the major symbolic resources and 
inspiration for the community of discourse in their production of reform discourse. There has 
been a parallelism between the media reform ideas and the economic reform ideas in the past 
decade (Chen, 1999). Change in media thinking is basically a process of constant borrowing 
from the economic reform thoughts, both in initiate a reform activity or justifying the existing 
reform practices. This borrowing partly explained why scholars have so often employed the 
models and theories of economics and management to explain the changes in Chinese media 
(Chen, 1999; Huang & Wei，1998; Huang & Ding，1997). 
Why did the ideas and practices of economic reforms become the conceptual source of 
the new paradigm? In chapter one we mentioned one theoretical premise of this paper- the new 
paradigm may be successful in solving the crisis and explaining the anomalies that can not be 
solved within the old paradigm. Under this premise, the most important claim by the 
proponents of the market-based media paradigm is that it can solve the media's pressing 
problems, including the budget-crisis. This problem-solving ability can be used to legitimize 
the new paradigm. 
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I will argue that old paradigm change through the processes of the transplantation, 
domestication and legitimation of the market-based media logic. Through the processes the 
new concepts gain strength and legitimacy and are incorporated into the old concept system. 
These three processes may not occur sequentially. Instead, they can overlap and intertwine 
with one another. The following sections will analyze them separately although they are 
integrate parts of a whole process. 
Transplantation 
Transplantation is a process of borrowing from the already established theories and 
practices of the other sectors of the society by the journalistic community. Previous studies 
have found that the new ideas of reform come mainly from the outside of the community. The 
reform and opening policy gave the journalistic community "multiple choices" in constructing 
its theories, many theoretical frameworks of other disciplines are introduced into the 
community (Shen，1997). The ideas of media reforms in 1990s are mostly borrowed from the 
already acclaimed economic reforms (Tu, 1996). 
"Competition mechanism，，is a case in point. The social imperative for the conceptual 
transplantation is the crisis of the media—the crisis in popularity and the crisis in finance. 
The introduction of the competition mechanism into media reform started in the 
southern province of Guangdong. The spill-out effect of the Hong Kong electronic media gave 
the citizens in Guangdong access to the commercial Hong Kong broadcasting programs, which 
enjoyed great popularity in the Mainland (Chan, 1994). Starting from the broadcasting reforms 
in the Guangdong as early as 1986, a new type of radio station- economic radio stations O'mgji 
tai) was established to compete with Hong Kong commercial radio stations. The Mainland 
economic radio stations borrowed heavily form the Hong Kong media, both in the 
entertainment-oriented content and in its vivid formats (Chan, 1994). The origin of the 
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competition was brought by the commercial radio stations in Hong Kong, which have no 
commitment to the old rules and norms of the traditional Chinese journalism. The drive to 
compete with the Mainland media was to add their advertising revenue. Like it or not, their 
Mainland counterparts found that they have to leam to accept the idea of stations competing in 
the same market. 
“Competition，，also brought huge commercial revenue to the media organizations like 
the economic radios in Guangzhou. Feng (1995) observed that the Pearl River Economic radio 
station in Guangdong become so successful that the reform spread from south to north 
geographically and from the local media to the regional or even the national media. 
Domestication 
The domestication of new conceptions involves the transformation of original 
conceptions for a better fit with the social context. Domestication of media reform ideas is 
often a necessary balance between the market logic and the party logic In China's unique social 
settings. The media organizations refrain from practicing the extreme form of 
commercialization, rather, they manage to discover intermediate qualities of the old and new 
ideas that bind together otherwise incompatible traits. 
The "competition mechanism" on a limited scale in Chinese media reforms was built 
through such a process. The mechanism became a hybrid of the Party logic and the market 
logic. It is limited competition under many conditions. The competition is mostly an internal 
one among the media organizations controlled by the Party. The head of the Shanghai 
Broadcasting and Television Division, Zhao Kai, said that Shanghai electronic media has 
"been connected with the world track" through the reforms, yet he had to admit that the 
competition is not a genuine one®. The newly established Oriental Radio station and Oriental 
8 Zhao Kai, the top official of Shanghai's Broadcasting and Television Division, in a talk on May 9,1995. 
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Television of Shanghai still need the approval of the propaganda department before any key 
policies is made. 
So it is not strange that the media market is still a highly protected one with the status 
of the major party organs well protected by various administrative means. Chen (1999) 
observed that the competitive level of media is much lower than other business sectors. Even 
after the competition mechanism was built in the journalistic community, the monopoly status 
of the CCTV is further solidified by the "Must-carry Policy", which claims that the local 
television stations must carry the prime-time news and commercials of CCTV (Pan & Chan, 
1999). 
Through the process of domestication, the new market-based media paradigm manages 
to find a room in the established media institutions, without directly challenging the core 
concepts of the old paradigm. Despite the limitations, the new paradigm begins by sharing the 
stage with the old paradigm before its relative weight grows. And once the idea of competition 
succeeded in sharing the stage with the once dominant paradigm, it would have a chance to 
operate with its internal logic in the future. In fact many other press reforms in finance were 
introduced into the community literally "to survive the market competition", particularly the 
competition for the advertising revenue (Chen and Lee, 1999; Li, 1995). 
Legitimation 
Legitimation is a process in which a new idea or practice is justified and recognized by 
the coiranunity members. In the past, the authority from the Party and government is only 
source of the legitimacy, but with the emergence of the new paradigm, this process is one of 
appealing to diverse sources - the authority, the growing demand of the public, the market and 
so on. 
There are two basic means of legitimation in Chinese media. One is to appeal to the 
formal or informal approval of the Party leaders, that is, the approval from above. The other is 
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gaining the "approval of the market" or the "approval of the audience". While the former is still 
important, the later is getting more influential. 
The 1992 speech by Deng Xiaoping constituted a decisive turning point in the 
struggles of reforms. Deng's 1992 speech and the reactions to the speech opened the horizon of 
the media reform. After the publication of his speech, there came a flood of articles devoted in 
the development or the "application of the spirit of Deng's speech in the practice". The 
underlying message of this quotation is that if the media reforms can be framed in the spirit of 
Deng's speech, then it is at least partially legitimized. Approval can also come from the local 
Party leaders. Policymakers in Shanghai, for instance, came to realize that the easiest way to 
improve the quality of the radio or TV programs is to split a traditional media organization into 
two and let them compete with each other. This "Shanghai electronic reform model，，was the 
most popular and successful reform practice during 1993-1994 (Feng, 1995). It was preached 
as a model of media reform afterwards and part of the institutional arrangement. 
More importantly, the new paradigm gets the approval from the market, and new 
principles of judging the media organizations are gradually built up. 
For example, in the 90s the local evening papers became the best-sellers in the streets 
and their private subscription rates far exceeded those of the party organs. The mass-appeal 
papers not only achieved complete financial independence, but also contributed profits and 
taxes to the state treasury. Some evening newspapers became the "cash cow" of the units to 
which they attached (Ding, 1999). Many noticed that in big cities, the most luxurious new 
buildings are basically buildings built by the banks and the major newspapers (Xu, 1998). This 
is said to be the benefit brought by the introduction of the competition mechanism. Chen and 
Guo (1998) observed that there is a widening "revenue gap" between the party papers and the 
mass-appeal papers since the 1992. The mass-appeal papers are getting more advertising 
revenues while the market share of the major party organs are shrinking. This is a further 
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evidence of the market's attitude to the two kinds of newspapers, and also an indication of the 
rise of the competition and the decline of monopoly. 
When a new concept such as competition has gained legitimacy, it will be used as a 
tool to develop or introduce other new concepts and practices into the community. Once the 
new paradigm emerges, it will have its inner logic and motivation to grow and develop. Xie 
(1998) pointed out that there was no way to stop once the media organizations have joined in 
the market competition. Model media organizations are constantly pushed to find new ideas to 
keep their advantage in the market, while the other media organizations try to catch up with the 
already advanced ones. 
New practices also create a need to develop the media theories. At first, the economic 
reform of the media was only a survival necessity, but after a few years, a set systematic theory 
of media industry "need to be developed" (Huang and Ding, 1997). 
3.2 The modification of the old paradigm—attention-shifting and redefining 
Old and new paradigms are competing for attention and acceptance. There is always 
resistance against change from the proponents of an established paradigm. Attitude change for 
the supporters of the old paradigm means conquering the inertia and putting faith in the more 
promising new paradigm. This may be a hard and time-consuming process. For the community 
as a whole, in dealing with the old paradigm, the process involves attention-shift and 
redefining the old ideas. While the new paradigm gains an increased emphasis, the old 
concepts and practices are increasingly devalued. 
Attention shift 
Attention shift is the re-allocation of the community's attentions to the different 
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paradigms. Through this process the dominance of the old paradigm is diluted. 
Having seen the fruitfulness of the new paradigm both in problem-solving and in the 
future promise, more and more community members choose to adopt the new market-based 
media paradigm. In putting their attention into the new ideas and practices, the members 
subconsciously or deliberately neglect the old paradigm. Less attention is paid to the old 
concepts and practices, although there is no open opposition to them. Less emphasis is put on 
the old Party-press paradigm when the media reforms are diverted into business aspectss. 
In terms of the media structure, the shift from the monopoly to competition provides a 
vivid example. The 1990s has seen a significant shift towards a more commercialized and 
pluralistic press and the relative decline of the monopoly of party organs. 
With the introduction of competition, most major party organs have to be supported 
financially by the mass-appeal newspapers attached to them. In 1998，an official survey shows 
that the profit of 53 major party organs was 274 million RMB yuan, while the total profit of the 
mass-appeal newspapers attached to them was 522 million RMB yuan^. The bulk of advertising 
fees went to the mass-appeal newspapers. The financial success of the mass-appeal newspapers 
is at odds with the monopoly of the party organs, a key idea of the Party-press paradigm. It is an 
irony towards the end of 90s, many party organs have actually become financially attached to 
the mass-appeal newspapers. Some observed in 1999 that the rise of the mass-appeal 
newspapers has made the party organs "lose their confidence" and "lose their status，"。. A 
further evidence of the decline of the monopoly in journalism was that in 1999,24 major party 
organs, including People's Daily, appealed to the Propaganda Department of the Party and the 
9 China Journalism Yearbook, 1999，pp77. 
10 China Press (Zhongguo baoye), 1999.5. pp4-6. 
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government administration, demanding for policy support. They claimed that the party organs 
were already in a very disadvantaged position in the market competition". 
For those working for the party organs, there is a feeling of being neglected. Some 
worried about the quick rise of the tabloids and the sharp drop in the status of the party organs 
(Xinhua Daily's editing committee, 1996). Ding Ximan^^ then the chief-editor of the major 
party organ, Shanghai Jiefang Daily, complained about the declining status of the party organs. 
He said that the privileges that the party organs once enjoyed now had almost all gone. Once 
some important conferences only invited the journalists from the party organs to make 
interviews, but now all the major papers are invited. The relationship between the major 
information sources and the media has changed to the disadvantages of the Party organs. While 
talking about the party organs' privileges, Ding used a metaphor: “ once we were the only child 
of the party, but now we suddenly have a lot of little sisters and brothers". 
Ding's attitude suggests how the benefactors of monopoly media structure react to the 
market competition and the changes in the media market. While it is still politically risky to 
decline the importance of the major party organs, the majority of the market resources and the 
emphasis of the journalistic community have shifted to the mass-appeal newspapers, rather 
than the theoretically important party organs. That is why Xu Guangchun, a top Party 
propaganda official, warned in 1999 the chief-editors to put more energy on the major Party 
organs, not merely on the profit-making "small newspapers" attached to them^^ 
"China Press (Zhongguo baoye), 1999.6，pp8. 
12 This talk was Ding's discussion on the Party organs' status in an informal seminar held by the School 
of Journalism, Fudan University on 23 May, 1995. 
13 China Press. 1999.5，p4-6. 
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Redefining the old conceptions 
Impact brought by the new paradigm leads to the feeling of imbalance and 
misunderstanding among those experienced practitioners who are familiar with the old 
paradigm. They need to go through a process of redefining the old conceptions to incorporate 
the elements of the new paradigm. Quite a few rigid concepts under the old Party-press 
paradigm have been revised in the 1990s. 
For example, the change in the media structure brings a need to redefine evening 
papers' feature and the party organs' feature. At first, the evening papers' popularity is 
attributed to their unique feature of social news, entertainment news and the business 
information (Xinhua Daily's editing committee, 1995). The party organs, on the other hand, 
specialize in the hard news. But the definition of the evening papers' feature has changed after 
1995, when the party organs started to realize that they need to redefine the old conceptions to 
justify their reforms. Ding Xinman put the logic this way, “we (party organs) once assumed 
that the human interests and entertainment orientation was the evening paper's unique feature, 
but now we realize that these are not their patent and privilege, but one of their advantages. The 
advantage can be borrowed by party organs."^ "* The revision in definition justifies the 
entertainment orientation in the editing policy of the major party organs in late 1990s. Soon 
after Ding's reflection, in 1996, Jiefang Daily became to publish the "Weekend Special 
Sections (shuangxiu tekan)" which accommodate the practices of evening newspapers in 
editing. Other major party organs also published their own mass-appeal “ small newspapers" 
(Cao, 1999). The revision of the old conceptions is a necessary process in adopting the new 
ideas. 
Through redefinition, the elements of the old Party-press paradigm fall into new 
“Ding Xinman, informal talk on 23 May, 1995. 
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relationships within the new paradigm. 
For example, with the introduction of competition mechanism, the proponents of the 
old paradigm reluctantly learned that there must be a change in party organs' relationships with 
the other social sectors. In the subscription "battle", the heads of the party organs now have to 
"beg" the state-own units to subscribe to their papers". In the past, party organs can give 
administrative "orders" to the state-own units to promote their subscription. Yet in the 
environment of market competition, the party organs even have to provide some financial 
incentives such as the prize, the commissions to ensure their subscription rate (Shi, 1996). 
Change in the organizational behaviors shows the changes in the power relationships. During 
this kind of redefinition and repositioning, the community gradually denied the monopoly of 
the party organs. 
3.3 The future of paradigm change 
people often approach new facts and new ideas with some acquired and habitual mode of 
thinking. Thus the new paradigm is accepted only when (1) it can solve the crisis the old 
paradigm can not handle, (2) it is more successful in clarifying the dark spots of the current 
difficulties. 
The relative rise of the competition mechanism and the relative decline of the 
monopoly in Chinese journalism suggest how the paradigm of the community changes with the 
time. After 1992，with official recognition of the top media official (e.g. Liang, 1996) the 
competition mechanism became part of the institutional arrangement. Song (1999) predicts that 
after the super-high-speed media revolution there will be a period of stable development of the 
media industry after 1990s. He also predicts that with the formation of an incomplete media 
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market the competitions among the media organizations will continue and intensify. Having 
accepted the competition idea, the next problem to solve for the community is to set up a fair 
and scientific mechanism and prevent the destructive competition (Liang, 1996). 
We have demonstrated the process by which competition, a key idea in the market-
based media paradigm, is adopted by the journalistic community. But in this process the old 
paradigm remains dominant. The basic framework of the commandist institution has not been 
abandoned so far (Wu & Liao，2000)，so in this sense the change in the paradigm is limited. 
I need to stress that the paradigm change in media reforms is a time-consuming process. 
In fact, some of the opponents of the new paradigm will never be convinced. They choose to 
stand by the old paradigm till the end of their career, even till the end of their lives. For instance, 
Guo Chaoren (1997), one of the major leaders of the country's biggest news agency, Xinhua 
agency, published a new book on the old paradigm titled “ On Mouthpiece Theory". In the 
preface of this book, a summary of his 40-year journalistic experiences, he said, "Mouthpiece 
Theory has been harshly attacked by the Western media. However, this does not surprise me. 
What makes me sorry is that the theory is now also under attack by some people in Mainland 
China. .. .Those who find fault with the mouthpiece theory of media are politically naive and 
ignorant in theory." Aware of the social context of late 1990s, Guo remarked, in 1997, with 
little confidence that "the publication of this book maybe still have some value (bold 
added).，，i6 
At one extreme, resistance to a new paradigm may take the form of suicide - people 
choose to die for their faith. A senior researcher of Beijing University, a loyal opponent to 
Ding Xinman, informal talk on 23 May, 1995. 
Guo (1997), pl-7. 
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market economy, killed himself after Deng Xiaoping's 1992 speech^ .^ In his review of the long 
history of scientific development, Kuhn (1962) found, sadly enough, in some cases new 
paradigms triumph not by making the opponents see the light, but rather by waiting for the 
opponents' eventual death. My study covers only ten years in the process of paradigm change, 
it is inevitably difficult to reach observations and conclusions as deep and complete as Kuhn's. 
My prediction of the media reforms is that the coexistence and contestation of the two 
paradigms will continue for a quite long period of time. 
17 Ma and Ling (1998)，p205-209. 
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Chapter Four 
Conclttsion and Discussion 
In the previous chapters, I offered my analysis of the changing paradigms in China's 
media reforms. I organized my study around one key concept the "paradigm of media 
operation", which permeates the public discourses on the media reforms. My analysis shows 
that two recognizable paradigms coexist in China's media system in the 1990s. They are the 
Party-press paradigm, which has reigned Chinese journalism for decades, and the newly 
emerged market-based media paradigm. Despite their co-existence, they are also in a state of 
constant struggle and contestation with each other due to their differences in worldview and in 
rules and principles of media operations. By incorporating the components of the market-based 
media paradigm, the Party-press paradigm changes in 90s. Yet, there is no sign that the old 
paradigm's domination is abandoned. Though theoretically, this thesis treats the two paradigms 
as counterparts, in reality, it is still too early to claim that a genuine market-based media 
paradigm and its institutional arrangements have been developed.. The "models of media 
reforms" discussed in this paper are actually the beneficiaries of both the two paradigms, not 
only the new one. They share the features of (1) being politically obedient to the ideological 
principles of the Party journalism; (2) having achieved market success, particular in the 
advertising market; (3) enjoying popularity among the audience. These features are related and 
interdependent to one another. 
In my attempt to depict the complexity of China's media reforms, I also employ the 
concept of "community of discourse". Three kinds of actors are involved in this 
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community~media professionals, media policy-makers, and media scholars. In the reform 
discourse, incoherent or contradictory theories are mixed together. The uniqueness of reform 
discourse lies in the contestation and coopation between the social actors of the discursive 
community. A key feature in constructing the reform discourse in contemporary China is to 
strive for at least surface coherence by bringing ideas from two paradigms together and 
unifying them under the umbrella of the changed Party-press paradigm. This is particularly the 
case for those in the "model media organizations of media reforms". A typical official is likely 
to be a loyal proponent of the old paradigm, yet be skeptical to the new one. The media scholars 
and professionals, on the other hand, are open-minded to the new paradigm, and becoming 
growingly detached to the old paradigm. Yet the old paradigm is challenged but not abandoned. 
Under the arguable theoretical premise prescribed by Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Party-press 
principle and the market-based media principle are thought to be compatible in the same media 
system in China. This uneasy compatibility is especially apparent in the reform discourse on 
China's media reforms. This feature may be quite characteristic of reforms under the leadership 
of a political power that has vested interest in the old paradigm. 
Their interactions are carried through the process of the professionals and media scholars' 
active transplanting and domesticating the new ideas and practices, and the policy-makers' 
passive approving them. Before a new reform idea is introduced in China's media system, it 
needs to be partly legitimized and politically safe to the old paradigm. In China's media reforms, 
the source or inspiration of the reform idea is mainly from the economic reforms. That is why 
new concepts like "competition mechanism" can be successfully transplanted, domesticated 
and legitimized within the highly hierarchical framework of the Party-press media system. At 
the same time, the old paradigm needs to make adjustment to give the new paradigm some 
conceptual and institutional space. The adjustment is made through the process of shifting the 
community's attention to the financial aspects of media system, redefining the old conceptions 
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to enable them fit into the changed social relationships. Through these processes the Party-
press paradigm and the media institution are deconstructed and reconstructed. In this sense, we 
can put the change of paradigm and the resulting paradigm in two ways. We can say the 
ingredients of the new paradigm grow and gain weight within the framework of old paradigm. 
To put it in another way, we can say the old paradigm change by reducing the weight of the 
traditional Party-press paradigm and adding the components of the market-based media 
paradigm. 
Paradigm changes in media reforms involve a dynamic of ideological contestation. They 
can not be as clean as paradigm shift discussed in Kuhn's study (1962). The new paradigm, 
while drawing its resources from alternative sources (e.g., experiences of advanced western 
countries, market activities), nevertheless grows in the larger social environment of 
contemporary China, which is still characterized as a Communist Party-led authoritarian 
society. It is in this sense, it grows within the overall framework of the old paradigm through 
modifying certain constituting elements and pushing the boundaries of the old one. The new 
paradigm itself contains elements of both the old and the new. 
The study is an effort to understand the social changes following the tradition of 
sociology of knowledge (e.g., Wuthnow). The above-mentioned research findings may be 
generalized to ideological contestation in other time and space. In this study, media changes in 
90s are understood by the coupled relationships between the discourse and the practice, and 
ideas and their social settings. My analysis shows that the members of discursive community 
must often link the reform practices with the ideological principles prescribed by the old 
paradigm. However, the practices and the crisis of the media institution due to the changed 
social arrangements push the community to open some conceptual territories for the market-
based media paradigm. The revision in the media theories then paves the way for further 
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reform practices and institutional reconfiguration, which in turn corroborate the new ideas. 
There is still much to explore in the sub-processes involved in articulation and dis-articulation 
of the reform ideas and their social settings. In this thesis, I examined China's media reform 
discourse in the 1990s, yet, the reform practices mentioned briefly in this paper are not based 
on personal observations. The data (reform discourse) can only provide how the members of 
the discursive community present and interpret reform ideas and activities. The reform 
practices mentioned in this paper are what Tuchman (1976) called "constructed realities". 
Many meaningful yet not legitimized reform activities are out of the vision of the study. In this 
respect, the study is limited. This limitation in research design may be improved by 
diversifying the methodology in the future studies. 
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